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This paper examines the case for reform of Australia's Personal Income Tax
(PIT), argues that it is outdated, and demonstrates a growing consensus for
reform. The importance of tax avoidance, particularly the use of trusts, in the
Australian PIT system, and arguably its abrogation of modern-day criteria of
what constitutes a 'good tax', is emphasised. Three possible 'reform' options are
identified: the 'tinkering and tokenism' approach ofcurrent Government policy;
moderate reform and a proposed 'significant reform option' costing around $22
billion. Essentially this comprises company and top PIT rate equalisation and a
doubling of the tax-free threshold. But funding this is problematical. Two key
arguments of the paper are that: (real) simplification i.e. lower compliance
costs, is an important yet usually down-played objective in reform proposals;
savings from reform denying PIT deductions such as work expenses are
insufficient to achieve significant PIT reform. An increase in the rate of the
Goods and Services Tax (GST) from 10% to 15% (with a compensation package)
is therefore advocated in a revenue-neutral analysis ignoring current
Government budget surpluses. The overall outcome would be a simplified, more
equitable and incentive-driven PIT system that would move Australia closer to
the PIT and GST policies ofother OEeD countries. But the political difficulties
ofreform mean that the Government's 'tinkering' approach is likely to continue.
Key Words: Personal Income Tax, Tax Reform, Tax Simplification
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1 Introduction
The Australian Personal Income Tax (PIT) system is an outdated relic of the post-war
period up until the 1980s. Many other OECD countries have reformed their PIT by
reducing the number of tax rates and reducing or eliminating high marginal tax rates
(Sandford, 2000, pp. 51-52 and 158-160). Most OECD countries have higher income
Tax Policy Research Unit, School of Economics and Finance, Curtin University. Thanks to Prafula
Femandez and lan Kerr for their advice on an earlier draft of this paper, and particular thanks to an
anonymous referee for insightful and helpful comments. Note that this paper cites the relevant published
data in specific year dollars and source; data are not expressed on a common year price basis. This paper
was written prior to the Commonwealth Government 2005-06 Budget (www.budget.gov.aul2005-06) that
made a small step in the right direction.
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thresholds than Australia (Warren, 2004a, pp. 121-122). In short, Australia's PIT is
outdated. There appears to be a growing consensus holding this view and favouring PIT
refonn.
From primarily an economic perspective, the equity of Australia's PIT is a myth.
Whilst the Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE), now known as and part of the wider Pay-As-
You-Go (PAYG) withholding tax system, is progressive and reasonably equitable, the
PIT as a whole is inequitable, and its equity is a myth that politicians and other sections
of society perpetuate because of their vested interests. The (Australian) PIT is divided
into two separate groups or 'nations',l basically those taxpayers that are part ofPAYG
i.e. individual wage and salary earners, and those taxpayers that use trusts, partnerships
and/or companies in a complex web of tax returns by the whole family in order to
minimise their overall tax liability (i.e. tax avoidance2). As is well known, the PIT is
affected by bracket creep (inflation pushing taxpayers into a higher marginal rate tax
bracket or increasing the average rate of PIT within a bnickef) that the Government (of
whatever political persuasion) exploits to its advantage.
From a political perspective, PIT payers are unorganised and do not have an
effective lobby group. Yet, at the 2001 election, 86% of voters considered tax policy as
very important (Davidson, 2004, p. 3). The millions of unorganised PIT payers may be
contrasted with the powerful lobby groups of business e.g. Business Council of
Australia, Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the professions e.g.
Australian Medical Association, agriculture e.g. National Fanners' Federation, and
social and welfare e.g. Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS). Moreover,
politicians, certainly over the past twenty years or so, gear their tax policies to the
median voter and thus favour middle-income taxpayers, to the neglect of lower and
upper income taxpayers. But most importantly PIT refonn is politically 'just too hard'.
The complex Australian PIT system is characterised by a significant tax avoidance
industry that may be estimated through tax compliance costs. The latter, when added to
the ATO's administrative costs, gives the operating costs of the PIT system. The high
marginal PIT rates give rise to three main negative economic effects: work
disincentives; distortion effects within the economy, in terms of individual and business
decision-making and also the interaction of the tax and welfare systems; and loss of
productive Australian skilled and professional workers offshore.4
These major factors largely explain why Australia's PIT is outdated and in need of
urgent and significant refonn.
This paper has four main objectives regarding PIT refonn: to analyse relevant key
data and the rationale for refonn; to review the magnitude of the Government's main
options; to develop a significant proposal that builds upon a fundamental principle on
which there is a growing consensus (30% top PIT rate) but that includes two possibly
contentious propositions (increasing the tax-free threshold and abolishing Capital Gains
4
As far as this author is aware, the tenn 'two nations' was first referred to in Covick (2004, explained in
pp. 257-259). This provides an apt description of the situation, discussed briefly later in this paper.
Tax avoidance can be costly and may have consequences under Part IVA of the Income Tax Assessment
Act, 1936. Tax evasion is illegal.
Most of the revenue the government gains from bracket creep comes from the devaluation of the benefits
of the infra-marginal rate taxed segments of taxpayers' incomes rather than change of marginal rate
effects, although the latter do impact heavily on incentives for those affected.
Such issues are not the focus of the present paper.
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Tax concessions); and to outline the major benefits and revenue costs of this proposal.
The paper is written from a 'first principles' tax policy approach that does not pander to
the majority and (some may say) the political realities of the day. It recognises the
important distributional issues involved in PIT reform but leaves that debate aside for
further work.
2 Key Data and Analysis
The PIT rates5 for 2004-2005 and the Government's changes in income thresholds for
2005-2006 are shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1





























Taxable income range in $
Source: ACCI (2004, p. 21).
Note: The Medicare Levy of 1.5% applies to most taxpayers with taxable incomes of$15,717 or more in
20~2005. Most taxpayers regard the Medicare Levy as a tax and therefore legitimately added to their
marginal tax rate. For example, the top rate of tax becomes 48.5%.
Using earlier data for 2001-2002 (Taxation Statistics, 2001-2002, (2004, pp. 10
and 16-21), the latest year published ATO statistics are available) shows that:
• 10.3 million personal taxpayers lodged returns6
• personal taxpayers had total income of $359 billion, taxable income of $342
billion and paid $80 billion in net tax
• 8.3 million personal taxpayers claimed $19.7 billion in total deductions?,
including $9.6 billion in work-related expenses8 (and 800,000 taxpayers
claimed $42 billion in business expenses9)
• around 7 million personal taxpayers were entitled to tax offsets and credits10
worth nearly $9 billion. I1
6
9
The Medicare Levy of 1.5% that applies to most taxpayers is disregarded in the rest of this paper for
simplicity (other than appropriate Table notes).
It is worth emphasising that the ATO publication Taxation Statistics uses the term 'taxpayer' to mean
different things in different tables, and care should be exercised when using this data source.
Personal taxpayer allowable deductions are deducted from assessable (or total) income for expenses
deemed worthy by the Government, e.g. work-related (p. 17).
Work related expenses are 49% of total deductions. Other deductions included prior year losses ($3.1
billion, or 16%), gifts $868 million (4%) and, interestingly, cost of managing tax affairs $933 million
(4%) (Table 3.2, p. 17).
The issue of business expenses is not considered here.
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Overall, the average PIT rate is 23%,12 a surprisingly relatively low figure, given
the highest marginal rate of47%.
Six important overall characteristics of the Australian Commonwealth tax system
and PIT in particular are:
I. The over-dependency of overall Commonwealth tax revenue upon PIT. For
example, in 2001-200249.2% of all Commonwealth Government tax revenue
came from PIT; PIT accounted for 73% of Federal Government income tax
revenue in 2001-2002 (Warren, 2004a, pp. 36-37).
2. The impact of the top marginal tax rate at just above average income levels.
For example, in 2002 this was only l.l times greater than GDP per capital3
(Davidson, 2004, p. 2); it cuts in at 1.3 Average Weekly Ordinary Time
Earnings (AWOTE)14 (CPA Australia, 2004, p. 18).
3. The better-off contribute a relatively high, and arguably an unduly high,
proportion of PIT. The bottom 37% of taxpayers 15 account for only 3% of tax
revenue; the middle 45% of taxpayers account for 38% of tax revenue; the top
18% of taxpayers account for 59% of tax revenue (estimated from Taxation
Statistics, 2001102, Table 3.1, p. 16 and Table 3.10, p. 24).
4. Whilst all PIT threshold levels have been affected by bracket creep, the impact
upon the tax-free threshold has been particularly significant, a point sometimes
disregarded by some. If the 1978-1979 tax-free threshold had been raised in
line with inflation i.e. in real terms, it would have been $13,549 in July 2003
and not $6,000 i.e. 126% higher16 (Warren, 2004a, p. 106).
5. Tax arbitrage is very significant. Whilst 20% of full-time wage and salary
earners had gross incomes greater than the top marginal tax rate threshold,
only 9% paid tax at this top rate in 2002 (CPA Australia, 2004, pp. 17-1817).
6. The (net) tax compliance costs of PIT are relatively high-around two-thirds
higher than those of the UK'8-and estimated at $1.5 billion in 1994-1995,
10 Tax offsets (fonnerly known as rebates) "provide tax relief for certain personal taxpayers": e.g. Iow
income earners, pensioners, and reduce the amount of tax payable on taxable income. Essentially they are
detennined by the Government's social security policy and are based on taxable income and other
factors. Tax credits are for tax already paid by the taxpayer or a trustee on his or her behalf (p. 20).
11 These include, for example, imputation credits (47% of total), tennination payments (16%), senior
Australians tax offset (12%) (Table 3.6, p. 21).
12 $80 billion divided by $342 billion (ibid.). It would be interesting to investigate how many PIT taxpayers
would accept a simple, no deduction and no offset flat rate of 23%!
13 For comparison, Canada was 2.19, Japan 5.32, Singapore 9.53, UK 1.69 and USA 8.46.
14 It cut in at three times AWOTE in 1980.
15 A taxpayer is defined as someone who submits a PIT return, thus including 1.9 million taxpayers (18%)
who pay zero PIT out of a total of 10.3 million PIT payers.
16 In the UK for 2003-2004 the tax-free threshold was 4,615 pounds (www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/rates), or
A$ I 1,538 at a typical exchange rate of one pound = 2.5 Australian dollars. Note that the UK figure for 30
June 200 I given by Warren (2004, p. 121) has omitted the tax-free threshold or zero rate. For further
comparison, in countries where tax-free thresholds exist, the rates converted to A$ as at 30 June 2001
were: France A$6,759; Canada (Federal) A$9,647; Singapore AS8, I 17 (selected examples only; Warren,
2004a, pp. 121-122).
17 Citing data from Reserve Bank of Australia (2003), Productivity Commission Inquiry on First Home
Ownership (2003) and Hansard (2003), Question No. 1638, p. 18169, 12 August. This statistic (that 55%
of 'top rate' tax-payers use tax avoidance) is one of the most compelling reasons in favour of PIT refonn.
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accounting for 4% of PIT net revenue in 1994-1995, and for 0.34% ofGDP in
1994-1995 (ATO, 1997,19 pp. 27-28). High income earners accounted for
$255 million (16%), medium income earners for $802 million (52%) and low-
income earners for $477 million (31%) (ibid. p. 26). Personal income
taxpayers in 1994-1995 spent $310 million on fees to professional advisers
after tax deductions (20%) and $873 million in time costs (57%) (ibid.)
In 2004-2005 PIT is forecast to raise around $102 billion (Warren, 2004a, p. 127).
Any reform of PIT needs to be viewed in the context of other relevant rates, for
2004-2005 as follows:
• Company tax 30%
• Capital Gains Tax (CGT)20 for highest rate income taxpayer:
47% if assets held for less than one year
23.5% if assets held for one year or more
• GST 10%
Personal income tax in the OECD countries in 2001 accounted for 26.5% of all
Government tax revenue in 2001-2002 (Warren, 2004a, p- 53), significantly lower than
the Australian figure ofjust over 40% (Davidson, 2004,2 p. 1). By comparison, the rate
of GST in OECD countries in 2001 averaged 18.5% compared with Australia's rate of
10% (Warren, 2004a, p. 53). Australian GST is growing strongly: it raised net revenue
of$30.7 billion in 2002-2003 (Taxation Statistics, 2001-2002, p. 153), $33.2 billion in
2003-2004 (AFR, 2004, p. 4), and is likely to raise over $34 billion in 2004-2005.
Before proceeding further it is important to recognise and emphasise the myth of
Australian PIT, namely that PIT overall is progressive and equitable. It is progressive
and reasonably equitable for PAYG taxpayers but not overall once other entities are
included. Trusts22 and partnerships pay no tax, but are entities that distribute income to
other entities i.e. individuals and companies, to which normal rates apply. Further, the
unit of taxation for trust income is the family rather than that of the individual, the
current basis for all PAYG taxpayers23 (see Covick, 2004; Sandford, 2000, pp. 54-61;
Head and Krever, 1996; and Dwyer, 2004, for discussion of this critical issue).
Arguments against Australia's PIT being equitable and progressive include:
• Use of trusts for business and investment income and ensuing tax avoidance is
inequitable (both vertically and particularly horizontally)
18 65% higher than UK expressed on a social compliance cost ofGDP basis when sole traders are included
(Australia: 0.63%; UK: 0.38%) (ATO, 1997, p. 65). The breakdown of the Australian figure is: 0.34% for
personal taxpayers (ibid., p. 28) and thus 0.29% for sole traders.
19 This major study has yet to be updated.
20 CGT is the tax payable on any 'net capital gain' included with any other assessable income on an entity's
(individual, company, trust or fund) tax return. In 1999 the Government introduced a 50% CGT
concession for personal income taxpayers holding assets for one year or more.
21 Citing ABS (2002) Taxation Revenue Cat.5506.0 data. Davidson's figure thus includes Federal, State,
and Local taxation. As noted earlier, PIT accounts for 49.2% of Commonwealth tax revenue.
22 The main type of trust in Australia is the discretionary trust. Trusts may be non-testamentary or
testamentary, the latter, arising as part of a will, generally being more beneficial from a tax avoidance
perspective (Covick, 2004, pp. 259-263).
23 Ironically, some parts of the PIT system and especially the welfare system require family income not just
an individual's income, thereby increasing administrative and particularly compliance costs.
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• Average business income of trusts is relatively very low, at $380,921 in 2001-
2002 (derived from Taxation Statistics, 2001-2002, p. 90)
• 58% of trusts have a loss or nil business income in 2001-2002, and a further
39% ('micro trusts') have business income of up to $2 million in 2001-2002
(Taxation Statistics, 2001-2002, p. 94)
• Only 4% have business income of $2 million per annum or greater
• Trusts reported $174 billion in business income in 2001-2002, with $160
billion in expenses (or 91% of income) (Taxation Statistics, 2001-2002, p. 90)
• Gross tax compliance costs of small trusts were roughly double that of other
business entities ($65.44 per $1,000 of turnover compared with an average of
$34.1324) in 1994-1995 (ATO, 1997, p. 79)
• Net tax compliance costs of small trusts (i.e. after tax deductions) were
roughly double that of other business entities ($55.34 per $1,000 of turnover
compared with an average of $26.9625) in 1994-1995 (ATO, 1997, p. 80)
Taxpayers that are part of the PAYG system (or 'nation') have lower tax compliance
costs on average than taxpayers using trusts (the 'other nation').26 Business net
compliance costs (estimated at $4.6 billion in 1994-1995) accounted for 9.4% of net
business tax revenue in 1994-1995 and 1.02% of GDP in 1994-1995 (ATO, 1997, p.
53), compared with PIT (net) tax compliance costs of 4% of net revenue and for 0.34%
ofGDP in 1994-1995, as noted earlier.
In 2001-2002 the composition of the 12.1 million entities submitting returns, in
rounded figures, was:
• 10.3 million individuals (85.3%)
• 650,000 companies (5.3%)
• 456,000 trusts (3.8%)
• 463,129 partnerships (3.8%)
• 211,000 funds27 (1.7%) (Taxation Statistics, 2001-2002, p. 7)
For the way in which trusts and related entity structures provide such an effective
way of tax avoidance see the excellent paper by Covick (2004, especially pp. 259-267).
This analysis clearly shows why PIT reform is long overdue.
A final theoretical point relevant to later reform arguments is that "an income tax
with a tax free allowance [or zero rate] and just one positive rate is progressive and may
be more or less progressive than a multiple rate system" (Sandford, 2000, p. 52; see the
worked example on pp. 52-53).
24 Sole traders were lowest at $27.72, followed by partnerships ($31.74), superannuation funds ($32.08),
and companies ($36.68).
25 Sole traders were lowest at $21.10, followed by partnerships ($24.81), superannuation funds ($27.51),
and companies ($28.56). The report explains these relatively high compliance costs in terms of: the
nature of the personnel (internal and external, and "primarily more expensive lawyers") and trusts
relatively low turnover (that increases the ratio of compliance costs to turnover). Both of these reasons
support the proposition that trusts are a vehicle for tax avoidance, particularly by relatively small business
entities.
26 As well as other business entities such as partnerships and companies-an issue not pursued further here.
27 Superannuation and life insurance funds.
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3 The Rationale for PIT Reform
Taxpayers deriving business and investment income and who use trusts, and in
comparison with PAYG taxpayers, are part of a PIT system that is:
• Inequitable
• Complex, with high compliance costs
Thus at least two (Le. equity and simplicity) of the four main criteria for a good
tax system28 are breached by the Australian PIT. Further, Covick (2004, p. 264) argues
that allocative efficiency is also likely to be breached by the use of trusts and the 'two
nations' PIT system.
Overall, arguably, the tolerance and importance of trusts in the Australian PIT
system abrogates all four of modem-day criteria of what constitutes a 'good tax',
namely equity, efficiency, simplicity and revenue-raising ability.
The critical question, in the context of the relatively recent failure of reform of
entity taxation29 and other pressures,30 thus becomes 'how might the PIT be reformed
"in one hit" in order to reduce as many of the current deficiencies of the present PIT
system as possible?'.
4 Government Options for Personal Income Tax Reform
Whilst there are any number of possible reforms to PIT depending upon economic,
political, and social affiliations and preferences, arguably the government has three
main reform choices.
Personal income tax reform is ultimately about the cost and risks to the Treasury,
points often ignored or downplayed by commentators. Realistically, revenue neutrality
(no major change in the real level of government tax revenue and ensuing expenditure)
means that foregone PIT revenue has to be recouped from elsewhere in the tax system.
But where?
The first 'reform' option may be termed the 'tinkering and tokenism' approach e.g.
small increases in upper-income thresholds in July 2004 and July 2005. Much lip-
service was paid to 'reform' but there was no real long-term change. Such 'reforms' are
likely to cost less than $5 billion in the year introduced, and do little more than keep up
with bracket creep over the previous few years. This would be the worst-case 'reform'
scenario.
28 Originally deriving from the days of Adam Smith, three criteria for a 'good tax' always cited in the
literature are: equity, divided into horizontal and vertical; efficiency, often referred to as neutrality;
simplicity. Most Governments and many academics and commentators now add a fourth: revenue-raising
ability. See ePA Australia (2004, p. II) for a useful summary in the context of Australian tax policies
since 1974.
29 The Government's proposed entity tax reform, frrst mooted in 1998 (under ANTS, 1998, and at the time
of the major 'push' for the GST) and developed under Ralph (Ralph Report, 1999), was effectively
abandoned in 2001, mainly due to strong lobbying by vested interests, particularly small business, and, to
a lesser extent, technical difficulties in the proposed legislation. (See Pope and Femandez, 200 I, pp. 146-
147 for a summary of recommendations and ensuing criticisms.) The Board of Taxation had advised the
Government that there were not compelling reasons to tax discretionary trusts like companies.
30 For example, tentative moves by business lobby groups to lower the company tax rate still further,
Government investment and fmancial objectives to maintain a buoyant economy and the role of eGT in
this, the interaction of tax and welfare, an ageing population, superannuation issues, and so on.
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A second option is the 'moderate approach'. The major feature could be a top PIT
rate of 40%-what a leading analyst saw as 'the most realistic possibility' in his recent
article on this subject (Warren, 2004b). A moderate reform package might cost between
$5 billion in the year first introduced and $20 billion, given reasonable rate reductions
and/or higher thresholds at the lower and middle parts of the PIT scale.
A third approach may be termed the 'significant reform option', costing over $20
billion in its first year (i.e. a cut of at least 20% in current net PIT revenues). This may
lower the importance of PIT to around 37% of all Commonwealth Government tax
revenue (down from 49% in 2001-2002).31 Such reform would be ambitious, requiring
statesmanship and political 'champions' (a pre-requisite of nearly all major tax reform
throughout the world) to drive it through (Sandford, 2000, pp. 184-186).
5 Significant PIT Reform
Significant PIT reform involves mitigating as many of the faults and difficulties of the
present PIT system as possible. These include the disincentive to paid work (at around
both the current tax-free threshold of $6,000 and the $58,001 32 threshold), the loss of
Australian professional workers overseas,33 the large size of the tax avoidance industry,
high administrative and particularly compliance costs of PIT, and inequities (especially
between the two 'nations'). It should include effective reform of the significant current
differences in the level of taxation upon so-called higher income salary persons and
business persons, labour and capital gains income, and the unit of assessment
(individual or family, as with trust income).
A longer-term perspective would· downplay the 'winners' and 'losers'
mentality so beloved by the Australian media and others. Reform should focus upon the
long-term benefits to the whole country (as in the case of the introduction of
Singapore's GST in 1994; Pope and Poh, 2001), and must include an adequate short-
term compensation package to those disadvantaged.
The objectives of PIT reform in Australia34 should be:
• To equate the top marginal rate of personal income tax (under PAYG) with the
company tax rate and also the top rate of capital gains tax (CGT) rate ('rate
equalisation'), specifically at a rate 000%
31 Ignoring any Laffer effects, discussed briefly later (footnote 57).
32 The $58,001 threshold (in 2004-2005) triggers a 42% marginal rate.
33 It has been estimated that around a million Australians work overseas, 90% of who are professionals with
most living in countries with lower PIT, such as UK, USA, Hong Kong and Singapore (private
communication).
34 The fundamental proposals presented here are not new, as a number ofauthors, e.g. Walker (2004), lobby
groups and professional organisations, e.g. ACCI (2004, p. 30), CPA Australia (2004, p. 7), and political
and economic commentators, e.g. Russel1 (2004), support the basic proposal of a 30% top PIT rate
aligned with the company rate. Indeed, Walker (2004, p. 10) cites a 2002 IMF report (Staff Report for the
2002 Article IV Consultation, p. 15) which argued that Australia would become more competitive in
trying to attract "internationally mobile capital and skilled labour". Other researchers support a
significantly higher tax-free threshold. For example, tax-free thresholds of $14,000 and $12,500 (the
latter indexed annually) have been proposed by Walker (2004, p. 13) and Saunders and Maley (2004, pp.
6-12) respectively. The latter argue that the tax-free threshold should be based on a 'subsistence income'
for a single person, being "the only practical way to overcome the problem of high effective marginal tax
rates (EMTRs) arising from the interaction of the tax and welfare systems". Pope supports this view that
strengthens the tax compliance cost argument.
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• To raise the tax-free threshold to $12,000 i.e. double its current level
('increased tax-free threshold'), and near restoration to its real 1978-1979
levees
A significant PIT rate and threshold reform proposal is shown in Table 2.
TABLE 2
PROPOSED SIGNIFICANT PIT REFORM
Proposed (Pope)
Taxable income range Tax rate in %
in$
Government Forthcoming














Note: An additional Medicare Levy of 1.5% applies to most taxpayers (refer footnote, Table I).
Rate equalisation would lead to:
• Lower tax compliance costs, particularly lower lawyers' and accountants' fees
to personal high-income and business taxpayers, plus lower opportunity costs
(especially time) in dealing with tax compliance' issues by taxpayers
themselves, leading to improved economic productivity
• A significant reduction in the tax avoidance industry, with lawyers and
accountants switching to more productive activities36
• Greater equity in PIT overall, significantly reducing the effect of the 'two
nations,37 PIT system
• Greater neutrality regarding the taxation of earned and unearned income
• A combined basic and top rate of 30% would, over time, reduce bracket creep
for over a majority of PIT payers38
• Possibly, lower ATO administrative costs
• Possibly, a relatively smaller hidden or cash economy
An increased tax-free threshold would lead to:
• Lower compliance costs of PIT
• Lower ATO administrative costs
• Near restoration of the real tax-free threshold rate to its 1978-1979 level
35 The ACCI (2004, pp. 27-28) does not support a higher tax-free threshold as this "could inadvertently
reduce the participation rate of those workers on higher incomes ... ". Suffice it to say that I reject such
arguments. The main arguments in favour (reducing tax compliance costs and helping overcome high
EMTRs) far outweigh any participation rate concerns.
36 Research estimating the economic benefits of this aspect of PIT reform is urgently needed. It is likely that
any estimate would be non-trivial given (net) tax compliance costs of PIT of $1.5 billion in 1994-1995
(ATO, 1997, pp. 27-28)-possibly hundreds of millions of dollars, and up to around $1 billion if the
value of PIT payers' time costs are included.
37 Covick (2004, pp. 257-259).
38 Refer footnote 3.
324
REFORM OF THE PERSONAL INCOME TAX SYSTEM IN AUSTRALIA
• Greater incentive to work for part-time workers, including students and house-
persons
• Greater incentive to make use of students and house-persons in income-
splitting arrangements39
Overall benefits would need to be fully researched and costed, but are likely to be
large.
TABLE 3
THE GROWING CONSENSUS FOR SIGNIFICANT PIT REFORM
Author/ 30% Top $12,000- CGT Approx. Timing!
Year Rate $14,000 30% Top Gross Cost of Comments
Tax-Free Rate- Package
Threshold $ billion
Walker, G. Yes Yes Not stated IMF supports 30%
(2004) Emphasises the top rate
Laffer effect
Saunders, Flat-rate Yes PIT 16.3 (plus Phased.
P. and B. (unspecif- 12 other) Overall funding
Maley ied;40% shortfall of $15
(2004) top rate to billion
begin with)
Warren 40% 'most na Justification for
(2004b) realistic: PIT reform in
media; 'in one
package' implied
CPA Yes No No Option costs Phased.
Australia outlined Eighteen scales
(2004) modelled: rates of
16/29/42 preferred
in short-term
ACCI Yes No PIT 10 (plus Phased.
(2004) four others) Six PIT options
considered




Pope Yes Yes Yes 22 Revenue neutral;




BCTR Report likely in
2005
BeIR: Business Coalition for Tax Reform.
- i.e., the 50% concession for holding an asset for over one year is abolished.
n.a.: not applicable.
- indicates not discussed.
Raising the tax-free threshold to $12,000 would take an estimated 800,000 low
income taxpayers out of the 'tax net': i.e. they would not need to submit a PIT annual
39 Later costing figures do not take this factor into account.
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return.40 This represents a reduction of around 42% of the approximately 1.9 million
taxpayers currently earning between $6,000 and $20,000. The compliance cost savings
are estimated to be at least $118 million per annum.41 Reducing the number of PIT
returns from around 8.4 million to 7.6 million,42 or by nine per cent, would reduce the
ATO's administrative costs of the PIT system.
Taxpayers (with part-time employment) earning $12,000 per annum would save
around $785 per annum in annual tax, or 6.5% of their income,43 plus time or agent
costs of not having to submit an annual tax return. A higher tax-free threshold would
give an incentive for some to work longer hours or enter the workforce. Of course all
PIT payers would gain from this measure, to varying relative amounts.
The growing consensus in favour of significant or radical PIT reform is summarised
in Table 3. However, an increased tax-free threshold is clearly not as well supported as
rate equalisation. This author places emphasis on the simplification benefits (and also
offset benefits to a proposed GST rate increase, discussed later). By contrast, other
commentators and bodies seem particularly concerned with various issues including
preventing certain PIT payers gaining an even greater advantage from their tax
avoidance practices, lower participation rates for workers on higher incomes and its
cost.
6 Cost of the Proposed Significant Reform of Personal Income Tax
The cost of the proposed reform to Australia's PIT would be roughly around $22
billion, comprising:
• $9.2 billion for increased tax-free threshold44
• $12.5 billion for reduced top rate to 30%45
It must be emphasised that these estimates are approximate and indicate orders of
magnitude. More precise estimates would need to be made by the ATO and Treasury if
ever the proposal became realistically contemplated.
40 This estimate assumes an even distribution of PIT payers in the $6,001 to $20,000 taxable income bracket
for the income year 2001-2002, as derived from Taxation Statistics, 2001-2002, Table 3.10, p. 24.
41 The ATO (1997, p. 27) estimated the personal taxpayer compliance costs of low income earners to be
$148 in 1994-1995. Disregarding inflation since then gives a conservative estimate of $118 million.
42 Taxation Statistics. 2001-2002, Table 3.10, p. 24.
43 $6,000 times 0.17 rate equals $1,020, minus the $235 maximum low income tax offset (that should be
abolished in any PIT reform), gives a saving of $785 p. a. (ATO 2003-2004 figures).
44 Warren has estimated the cost of adding $1,000 to the tax-free threshold at $1.527 billion in 2004-2005.
The cost of increasing it to $12,000 is thus 6 times $1.527 billion, or $9.16 billion (Warren, 2004a, Table
8.8, p. 128). Saunders and Maley (2004, p. 14) estimated the cost of increasing the tax-free threshold to
$12,500 at $10.3 billion.
45 Warren (2004a, p. 128) has estimated the cost of reducing the marginal tax rate (MTR) by 1% for
taxpayers earning $62,501 and above for 2004-2005 at $603 million. The cost of reducing MTR from
47% to 30% is thus 17 times $603 million, or $10.3 billion. Warren has estimated the cost of reducing the
marginal tax rate (MTR) by 1% for taxpayers earning between $52,001 and $62,500 at $184 million. The
cost of reducing MTR from 42% to 30% is thus 12 times $184 million, or $2.2 billion. Adding the two
together gives a total cost ofa 30% top rate of$12.5 billion. CPA Australia (2004, p. 14) cite a somewhat
lower figure than Warren, and state that "preliminary modelling indicates that each 1% cut in the top
personal tax rate would cost about $459 million at anticipated 2003-2004 income levels", or $7.8 billion
overall. The ACCI (2004, p. xv) estimated reducing the top PIT rate to 30% plus some other PIT reforms
at around $10 billion. The variability of estimates shows that some caution is therefore necessary. This
author prefers a conservative approach, i.e. an estimate on the higher side.
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Nearly all tax refonn these days is based upon a revenue neutral requirement from
Treasury and the Government. It would require a very radical Government to
significantly reduce the overall level of Government expenditure and hence taxation
revenue within the Australian economy. Some PIT refonn papers, e.g. ACCI (2004),
advocating moderate, phased-in refonn consider current Government revenue surpluses
largely sufficient to fund changes, whilst others (e.g. Warren 2004b) emphasise the role
of reducing PIT concessions and offsets to fund refonn.
The key issue thus becomes the most appropriate means of raising around $22
billion in order to fund significant PIT rate refonn.
7 Raising Tax Revenue to Fund Significant PIT Reform
The following analysis ignores any current projected Government revenue surplus that
has arisen through bracket creep. This is forecast to be $6.2 billion in 2004-200546 and,
if used as an offset, would affect the following estimates (beneficially).
7.1 Non-allowance ofPIT deductions
PIT deductions account for a very significant amount, namely $19.7 billion in 2001-
2002, although this figure does include more problematical items such as prior year
losses and gifts as well as items more easily abolished, particularly work-related
expenses of $9.6 million and managing tax affairs of $0.9 billion.47 This represents
around 24% of PIT net revenue. In line with a policy of simplifying the PIT system
(outlined above), such deductions should be critically reviewed and significantly
reduced.
Further, negative gearing of residential property costs the Government around $1.2
billion48-an issue worthy of policy change from a simplification and equity
perspective. This is recognised but not considered further here.49
Deductions of $19.7 billion have been identified for possible abolition, thereby
generating additional revenue of around $4.5 billion, based on the average PIT rate of
46 Australian Financial Review (2005), "Howard hints at possibility of further tax cuts", 16 March, p. 4,
citing Treasury's mid-year review.
47 ATO Taxation Statistics, 2001-2002 Table 3.2, p. 17. Denying deductions for some items such as
managing tax affairs and gifts for PIT returns yet allowing them for company, partnership and trust
returns may counteract somewhat reductions in the inequity between PIT payers and other entities (the
'two nations' problem) arising from 30% rate equalisation. This is arguably a small price to pay for PIT
simplification.
48 For the year 200D-2001. Estimated by Warren, 2004a, Table 9.8, p. 150 (based on original data from
ATO Taxation Statistics 2000-2001). Note that abolishing negative-gearing is a quarantining measure
that would deny the deductibi1ity of certain items until they can be deducted against the gross income
stream with which they are associated. As such, tax revenue benefits would be short-term and 'transitory'
providing that property owners eventually move into net profit, i.e. accumulated losses are then written
off against net profits, a point recognised by Warren, 2004a, pp. 154-155. However, its abolition would
reduce somewhat the need to remove some of the more problematical PIT deductions.
49 See Warren, 2004a, pp. 149-158 for a full discussion. The Productivity Commission's Inquiry on First
Home Ownership (2004) also addressed the issue (see www.pc.gov.au). but key findings were rejected by
Government. The latter stated that: "the Govemment considers that it would be inappropriate to change
existing arrangements relating to capital gains or negative gearing. The Government has improved
incentives to save and invest by introducing an internationally competitive capital gains tax regime. The
Government will therefore not be conducting a review of the tax system with respect to housing or
changing the capital gains tax provisions" (Treasurer, Press Release No. 051,23 June 2004).
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23%. This figure may be higher to the extent that claims for deductions are higher the
higher the income and marginal tax rate. For example, top rate taxpayers (with $60,001
or more taxable income pa in 2001-2002) accounted for 24% of all deductions
(totalling $19.7 billion) c1aimed.50 Warren (2004a, p. 159) has made similar estimates
i.e. $5.1 billion in extra tax revenue from non-allowance of$18.4 billion in deductions
using 2000-2001 figures. CPA Australia (2004, p. 56) estimated savings of $4.7 billion
per annum from abolishing work-related expenses (WRE) alone.
Abolition of personal work expenses would lower compliance costs as less time
would be spent completing the annual tax return by many taxpayers. Abolishing the taX-
deductibility of tax agents (placing the 28% of PIT payers who complete their own
returns with no tax deduction available for their opportunity costs on the same basis as
the 72% currently using a tax-deductible tax agent for their PIT return) should reduce
compliance costs but may increase ATO administrative costs if more errors arise in
annual tax returns if taxpayers currently using tax agents switch to self-completion.
Thus even a radical reduction in PIT deductions only raises around $5 billion, i.e.
less than a quarter of the cost of significant PIT rate reform. Revenue is therefore
needed from other sources. Whilst a vast array of options could be used by
Government, an obvious and realistic option is to increase the GST rate from its
relatively low current rate to, say, 15%51, much closer to the OECD country average of
18.5% (in 2001). This would lead to the usual equity arguments and effects on income
distribution, recognised but beyond the scope of this paper other than recognising the
necessity of compensatory arrangements. Increasing other Commonwealth taxes such as
excise duties rather than GST is not considered a viable option because of equity and
efficiency concerns.
7.2 Increasing the GST rate to 15%52
Net GST revenue in 2002-2003 was $30.7 billion, an increase of 14% on the previous
year,53 and is likely to be at least $34 billion in 2004-2005.54 Thus a 50% increase in its
rate would lead to probably at least $17 billion in 2004-2005 figures.
7.3 Overall
Abolition of PIT tax deductions (around $5 billion) plus an increase in the GST rate
from 10% to 15% ($17 billion) would raise a total of $22 billion in tax revenue, roughly
equalling the cost of the PIT rate reform presented earlier.
50 ATO Taxation Statistics. 2001-2002, p. 15.
51 Currently, all net GST revenue flows through to the States and Territories. There would be undoubted,
but not insurmountable, difficulties in increasing the GST rate and using the revenue at a Commonwealth
level in order to fund PIT refonn. This issue is recognised but not pursued further here.
52 Other revenue-raising possibilities are recognised but not pursued here. For example, payroll tax is less
regressive than GST and generally raises relatively higher revenue in EC countries than Australia, where
it could arguably be increased to 10%-15%. Payroll tax is, however, a State tax and is much disliked by
business, which generally would like to see its abolition!
53 Taxation Statistics. 2001-2002, p. 153.
54 Net GST revenue was $33.2 billion in 2003-2004 (Treasury, Fiscal Budget Outcome 2003-2004,
September 2004), 8.6% higher than earlier forecasts, namely $31.7 billion in 2003-2004 and $33.5
billion in 2004-2005 (Treasury, Budget Paper No. 3).
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The outstanding issue, which can only be considered briefly here, is a Government
compensation package to retirees, pensioners, welfare and family support recipients.
Rather than consider this on a needs basis, this is approached from a funding i.e.
available tax revenue, basis.
A compensation package to transfer payment recipients (to offset a one-off
inflationary impact of perhaps 3% or SO,55 and higher living expenses thereafter) could
be funded from:
• Additional gross revenue from increasing the Capital Gains Tax (CGT) rate
paid by top-rate PIT payers from 23.5% to 30% for assets held over a year less
losses from other taxpayers/assets: Relatively low and difficult to estimate56
• Laffer curve effectS? difficult to estimate and nearly always disregarded by
Government in any tax reform proposals as the outcome is high risk, but
possibly high
Thus figures for any compensation package are somewhat problematical, but
funding of at least $2 billion would need to be factored in to any PIT reform package
involving an increase in GST.
8 Concluding Comments
This paper has focused only on the arguments and supporting data in favour of a PIT
rate and tax-free threshold change. It has disregarded any distributional impact and
wider economic impacts e.g. inflation; such issues would require much further work
and econometric modelling. .
The paper has, however, demonstrated that a PIT reform package of around $22
billion is worthwhile. On a revenue-neutral basis, it has been shown that tax
simplification alone would not generate sufficient revenue to achieve this. Additional
55 Based on previous experience of 3% to 4%, after the 10% GST was introduced in July 2000 (although
there were offsetting inflation effects from the abolition of the Wholesale Sales Tax and some State
taxes).
56 In 2000-2001 around $2.3 billion was raised by CGT (Warren, 2004a, p. 149). A figure of $2.4 billion,
paid by some 880,000 individuals, is cited by the ATO for the 2001-2002 income year (Taxation
Statistics, 2001-2002, Table 9.4, p. 127). Increasing the CGT rate from 23.5% to 30% represents a 27%
increase. Thus the additional CGT revenue might be of the order of $0.6 billion, less lost CGT revenue
arising from capital gains (on any assets held for less than one year) taxed at the full rate (which for
taxpayers on the 47% and 42% marginal rate would fall to 30%). The net CGT outcome is likely to be a
comparatively low amount in terms of tax reform measures.
57 This states that a reduction in tax rates leads to an increase in tax revenue because of enhanced economic
performance i.e. higher real incomes, and parts of the hidden or cash economy now entering the official,
measured, and (most importantly) taxable economy. Whilst there would be positive effects from lowering
the top PIT rate to 30% (from 47%), there may be negative effects from increasing the GST rate to 15%
(from 10%). Arguably, the former effect is likely to be greater. Evidence on the Laffer effect is very
1imited, but the Reagan PIT cuts in the USA in 1981 (from 70% to 50% for the top rate) are often cited.
For example, Walker (2004, p. 10) states that "The Inland Revenue Service predicted a US$I billion drop
in collections from higher earners in 1982. The reverse happened .... There was a US$9 billion rise [in
1982 that continued in 1983]". The ACCI (2004, p. 22) cites a US Congress review of research (Saxton,
2001) that suggests that, on average, a 10% increase in the after-tax share of marginal income leads to a
4% increase in taxable income. The latter is much larger at higher incomes. Walker claims that a 28% cut
in the top tax rate led to an 11 % increase in tax revenue from the rich. More recently in Australia, cuts in
the company tax rate from 36% (in 1999-2000) to its current 30% have coincided with significant
revenue increases (also recognised by Walker, 2004, p. 10), although separating the Laffer effect from
cyclical and other economic factors is extremely difficult.
329
JEFFPOPE
funding would be needed. Increasing the GST rate from 10% to 15% (thereby raising at
least an additional $17 billion pa in tax revenue) seems the best option.
In the longer term, further meaningful PIT reform could concentrate on one or
more of the following:
• Increasing the threshold at which the standard rate of 30% commences
($21,601 taxable income pa)
• Further increases in the tax-free threshold of$12,000
• Introduction of a new low rate, of between 10% and 15%, to replace the 17%
rate
For the shorter-term, whilst all PIT payers would pay less tax under this proposed
package, lower and middle income taxpayers (with taxable incomes of between $12,000
and $58,000 pa) would gain the least, expressed as a percentage of taxable income. This
analysis clearly demonstrates the difficulty of major PIT reform and helps to explain
why both the Australian Government and Opposition tax policies continue to 'tinker at
the edges', with little if any real impact on PIT, as shown, for example, by proposed tax
policies during the election campaign in September-Dctober 2004.
An alternative to the proposal presented here is that by, for example, Covick (2004,
pp. 268-269), that income tax for all PIT payers should be based on thefamity unit (the
basis for taxation of trust income discussed earlier) rather than that of the individual
(the current basis for all PAYElPAYG taxpayers). Covick anticipates the extremely
high tax revenue cost of such a proposal. Indeed, this high cost to the Treasury merely
reflects the significant current benefits of tax avoidance per family for those using the
trust system.
By contrast, the significant PIT reform proposal outlined here focuses on PIT rate
and threshold reform (a very easy technical legislative reform) in preference to either
unit reform and, or, trust reform (both extremely complex from a legal perspective).
To conclude, the case for significant PIT reform is overwhelming. Australia has a
golden opportunity in the next few years to become one of the leading OECD countries
in terms of having an efficient, equitable, incentive-driven and internationally
competitive PIT system, rather than continually lagging behind other countries. But the
likely political difficulties of reform mean that the odds are on the Government merely
continuing to 'tinker' with our antiquated PIT system.
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